When people speak about the Hindu social system today, it is often described as a rigid and unchanging hierarchy. However, a closer look at classical texts, traditional commentaries, and historical practice presents a very different picture. The evidence suggests that Hindu society was far more flexible, adaptive, and responsive to changing circumstances than modern discussions usually assume.

At the heart of this system was the concept of ācāra—the customs, disciplines, and way of life followed by different communities. Every varṇa, jāti, and kula had its own ācāra. Rather than being a fixed set of rules, ācāra acted like a living framework that could absorb social, economic, political, and cultural changes while preserving continuity with the past. This ability to adapt without losing identity was one of the key strengths of Hindu civilization.

Modern sociologists such as M. N. Srinivas described certain forms of social mobility through the concept of "Sanskritisation." Yet the traditional Hindu understanding was much broader and deeper. The Upaniṣads, Dharmaśāstras, Āgamas, Tantras, and Nīti texts all point towards a society in which lokācāra, or the customs of the people, played an important role in shaping dharma itself.

In the traditional framework, varṇa was not merely a social category but a metaphysical principle rooted in guṇa and karma, intended to facilitate the gradual purification of the individual by addressing mala, vikṣepa, and āvaraṇa doshas, thereby preparing the aspirant for higher spiritual realization. While the Puruṣa Sūkta speaks of four varṇas (a term that some scholars have interpreted in certain contexts as referring to radiance, aura, or tejas/Brahma tejas), later Dharmaśāstra literature developed a much more detailed picture. Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, in his famous commentary on Manu, speaks of four śuddha varṇas and several mixed jātis. Traditional grammatical derivations of the word jāti include- jananena yā prāpsyate sā jātirityeke, janī prādurbhāve, jātir jātaṃ ca sāmānyam, jātiraprāṇinām. He explicitly describes these mixed jātis as many—and explains that they were recognized for purposes of social interaction and practical life (vyavahāra).

A similar idea appears in the Śukranīti, which states that jātis are endless in number and continue to arise through historical processes (4-3-11/15). The Mahānirvāṇa Tantra (Chapter-8) groups such mixed communities under the category of sāmānya and traces their origin to the four varṇas. Colebrooke's Jātimālā (from Rudra Yamala Tantra) also records this understanding. In this view, varṇa represents a broad metaphysical framework, while jāti represents the countless social formations that emerged across different regions and historical periods.

Jāti, therefore, cannot be reduced to occupation alone. It was a social community held together by shared customs, rituals, saṃskāras, food habits, marriage practices, and forms of worship. Historical evidence shows that a single jāti could engage in multiple occupations, and the same occupation could be practiced by members of different jātis. The relationship between jāti and profession was therefore far more flexible than is often assumed.

Several texts, including the Sarvollāsa Tantra and Viṣṇu Gītā, express the principle of ācāra-mūlā jāti—that jāti is rooted in ācāra (ācāramūlā jātiḥ syād ācāraḥ śāstramūlakaḥ | devavākyaṃ śāstramūlaṃ devaḥ sādhakamūlakaḥ ||). According to these texts, communities are distinguished not solely by biological descent but also by inherited customs, rituals, values, and patterns of conduct. Since ācāra shapes education, upbringing, duties, and social behaviour, it also influences the development of character and action within a community.

Birth played an important role because it was through birth that a person entered a particular tradition and inherited its ācāra. Within a jāti, the kula functioned as the hereditary ritual lineage (Mahābhārata-na kulaṃ kulamityāhurācāraḥ kulamucyate| ācāra-rahito rājan neha nāmutra nandate||). A kula was often associated with a particular kula-devatā, a set of saṃskāras, ritual obligations, and marriage rules. Traditional texts even state that it is not mere lineage that makes a kula; rather, it is ācāra (upāsanā and sādhana-based traditions) that truly defines it.

From this perspective, several kulas sharing similar customs, values, and traditional functions could together form a jāti. Kula may therefore be understood as the ritual lineage unit, jāti as the socio-cultural community, and varṇa as the broader metaphysical and normative framework within which they exist.

Ācāra serves as the bridge between the metaphysical ideals represented by varṇa and the lived social realities embodied in jāti and kula. It is through ācāra that abstract principles are translated into everyday social, ritual, and ethical practice.

Seen in this way, ācāra (Parāsara-caturṇāmapi varṇānām ācāro dharma-pālakaḥ| ācāra-bhraṣṭa-dehānāṃ bhaved dharmaḥ parāṅmukhaḥ ||) becomes the central operating principle of the entire varṇa–jāti–kula system. Communities preserved their identity not merely through descent but through the continued transmission and observance of their customs and disciplines. It was this living and adaptable nature of ācāra that allowed Hindu society to remain both stable and flexible over long periods of time.

This flexibility is exactly what Paravastu Chinnaya Suri and Narahari Gopala Krishnama Setti highlighted in 1869. They pointed out that different Smṛtis were written for different yugas and that, in actual practice, lokācāra—the customs followed by the people—often carried greater authority than the literal wording of the texts. Over time, many customs became so deeply rooted in society that the original meanings of certain scriptural passages were no longer clearly understood. This, in turn, led to the emergence of commentaries (bhāṣyas) and legal digests (nibandhas) to explain and interpret the older texts. Their observations suggest that Hindu law was never treated as a rigid and unchanging code. Instead, it functioned as a living tradition that evolved through the customs and practices of society.

Venkata Subbarao Pantulu, a lawyer of the Madras High Court, explained this principle in even greater detail in 1896 and 1911. He noted that courts recognized kulācāras and regional customs even when they appeared to differ from the Dharmaśāstras, provided those customs had been followed continuously, without interruption, and were accepted by the community concerned. This principle was recognized not only in the Smṛti tradition but also by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In practical terms, this meant that a long-established and widely accepted custom could take precedence over a textual rule. The authority of ācāra, therefore, was not merely theoretical; it had real legal force and shaped the actual administration of Hindu law.

Kilambi Venkata Srinivasacharyulu, another lawyer of the Madras High Court, took this discussion further in 1922. He explained how governments and courts gradually came to recognize long-standing customs as legally valid norms. Even when such customs appeared to differ from earlier scriptural rules, their continued practice and acceptance by society gave them the force of dharma in actual legal practice. He also pointed out that judicial decisions often helped clarify doubtful passages, resolve contradictions, introduce new principles, and in some cases set aside older Dharmaśāstra provisions that no longer matched contemporary ideas of justice. In this way, Hindu law evolved through a continuous interaction between śāstra, ācāra, and judicial interpretation rather than through the mechanical application of a fixed legal code.

The central role of ācāra in Hindu jurisprudence was recently highlighted by Justice Abdul Nazeer in his 2021 address on the decolonization of the Indian legal system. Drawing upon authorities such as Kātyāyana, Nārada, Manu, Parāśara, and the Arthaśāstra, he pointed out that custom (ācāra, sadācāra, caritra) occupied a vital place in the legal and social life of ancient India.

According to Kātyāyana, the State was expected to maintain authenticated records of customs prevailing in different regions. Customs that were widely followed and accepted were to be formally recognized and recorded. At the same time, customs were not regarded as beyond scrutiny. If a particular custom became inequitable or harmful, the sovereign possessed the authority to abolish it. This reveals a sophisticated legal system that sought to balance continuity with reform, preserving established customs while allowing society to correct practices that no longer served the common good.

Justice Nazeer also drew attention to an important statement of Nārada regarding the sources of judicial decision-making. Nārada identified Dharmaśāstra, previous judicial decisions (vyavahāra), custom (caritra), and the decrees of the sovereign as valid bases of law. Similar principles are found in the Arthaśāstra. These provisions demonstrate that custom was not merely tolerated as a social practice but was recognized as a legitimate source of legal authority.

Equally significant is the recognition that law had to respond to changing social realities. Manu and Parāśara acknowledged that different yugas required different social and legal arrangements, reflecting the distinctive conditions of each age. This did not mean that the fundamental principles of dharma were abandoned. Rather, it meant that their practical application could vary according to time, place, and circumstance. Ancient Indian jurisprudence therefore distinguished between enduring principles and changing social regulations, allowing continuity without sacrificing adaptability.

These observations reinforce the conclusions reached by several Telugu legal scholars discussed earlier. Hindu law was not conceived as a rigid and inflexible code imposed uniformly upon society. Instead, it evolved through a continuous interaction between śāstra, ācāra, judicial practice, and social consensus. In this framework, ācāra was not a secondary consideration but one of the principal mechanisms through which dharma adapted itself to changing historical conditions while preserving its underlying civilizational continuity.

Taken together, the observations of these scholars highlight the central role played by ācāra in the varṇa–jāti–kula framework. If jāti was rooted in ācāra, and if ācāra itself could change according to deśa (place), kāla (time), pātra (circumstance), and lived community practice, then Hindu society possessed a built-in mechanism for adaptation. Continuity was maintained not through uniformity but through the constant reinterpretation and transmission of customary norms across generations.

Śukranīti offers another important insight into the nature of society. It suggests that social rank was not absolutely fixed for all time but emerged gradually through the skills, arts, functions, and social usefulness of different jātis and kulas. Communities whose knowledge, services, military abilities, ritual expertise, or economic contributions were highly valued often enjoyed greater social prestige. Such status was never universal or permanent. It could vary from one region to another depending on local needs, political patronage, economic conditions, and historical circumstances. A jāti that enjoyed high standing in one area could occupy a very different position elsewhere. This fits well with the traditional idea that jātis are ananta—numerous and constantly evolving.

Because social standing was influenced by function, reputation, and contribution, ācāra became an important means through which communities adapted to changing circumstances. Jātis and kulas could adopt new rituals, new saṃskāras, new kula-devatās, and even new economic activities. Individuals were also not necessarily confined to a single hereditary occupation. Since jāti was never defined entirely by profession, people could and did take up occupations that suited their abilities and circumstances. Occupation shapes outlook, and outlook influences conduct. In this sense, ācāra allowed both individuals and communities to evolve while maintaining social continuity.

This flexibility also created opportunities for social mobility. Some communities rose quickly through military service, political influence, economic success, or ritual refinement. Others improved their position gradually through sustained effort, discipline, education, and adaptation. Social status, therefore, was not simply a matter of abstract hierarchy but was closely connected to historical circumstances and the changing needs of society.

At the same time, the traditional ideal of the system was not merely social advancement but spiritual refinement. The ultimate goal was the cultivation of higher qualities and alignment with the ideals associated with śuddha varṇa. This process was understood not only in social terms but also in spiritual terms, involving the purification of the kāraṇa śarīra (causal body) and sūkṣma śarīra (subtle body), thereby helping the individual progress towards mokṣa. In this understanding, varṇa represents a spiritual framework of guṇa and karma, jāti represents its social expression, and kula serves as the ritual lineage through which these traditions are transmitted.

The observations of these Telugu legal scholars also help us understand the difference between the pre-colonial and colonial legal orders. Traditionally, every jāti possessed its own ācāra, which evolved over time through the interaction of sampradāya, local custom, regional conditions, and changing social realities. While continuity was preserved, adaptation remained possible because authority was given to lokācāra, kulācāra, and established community practice.

A major change took place during the nineteenth century when the colonial state gradually abandoned the earlier system of consulting learned Hindu pandits on questions of Hindu law. The formal removal of the court pandit system in 1864 marked an important turning point. Thereafter, judges increasingly relied on English translations of Dharmaśāstra texts, legal digests, judicial precedent, and earlier court decisions rather than on the interpretive guidance of traditional scholars. Many observers believed that this change fundamentally altered the character of Hindu law. The significance of this transformation lay not merely in the introduction of legal change, for adaptation had always been part of the traditional system. Rather, colonial jurisprudence altered the mechanism through which adaptation occurred, shifting authority away from living ācāra, community practice, and traditional interpretation toward codification, precedent, translation, and centralized legal institutions. By giving greater importance to texts, translations, and precedent than to living custom, the colonial legal system increasingly distanced itself from the dynamic world of ācāra.

As customary practices were translated into the language of colonial jurisprudence, many living traditions were codified, redefined, or brought under centralized legal principles. The growing emphasis on uniform rules, bureaucratic classification, and precedent-based decision making gradually replaced the flexible and context-sensitive operation of ācāra. What had once been a system shaped by deśa, kāla, pātra, and community consensus increasingly came to be understood through fixed legal categories.

This process continued through later legislation, regulations, statutes, and administrative measures introduced during both the colonial and post-colonial periods. Matters that had once been governed primarily by local custom and community practice increasingly came under centralized legal authority. The Hindu Code reforms represented an important stage in this process by transferring many aspects of social life from customary regulation to statutory law.

Many traditional scholars viewed these developments as reducing the practical authority of ācāra within Hindu society. In their view, the combined effect of colonial jurisprudence, census classifications, centralized legislation, and modern administrative structures was the gradual hardening of identities that had once been more fluid and locally negotiated. The resulting social order was neither identical to the older varṇa–jāti–kula framework nor entirely a colonial invention. Rather, it emerged through the interaction of inherited jāti identities, transformed ācāras, colonial legal categories, and modern state institutions.

From this perspective, what we today call caste can be seen as a hybrid formation that emerged through the interaction of inherited jāti identities, transformed ācāras, colonial legal categories, census classifications, and modern state institutions. In other words, the history of caste is not simply the history of jāti. It is also the history of what happened when an ācāra-centered civilizational order was gradually translated into the language of modern law, administration, and social classification.

The key to understanding this system lies in ācāra. It was ācāra that connected varṇa, jāti, and kula; preserved continuity while allowing adaptation; and enabled society to respond to changing conditions without losing its civilizational identity. The resilience of the Hindu social order lay not in rigid uniformity but in its capacity to accommodate diversity within a shared dhārmika framework.

Political, economic, and social conditions continuously influenced the evolution of ācāra. Yet this adaptability operated within a broader framework of enduring dhārmika principles. The tradition therefore sought to preserve continuity at the level of fundamental values while allowing considerable flexibility in social practices and customary norms. Yet adaptation did not mean the absence of ideals. The traditional goal remained the refinement of conduct, character, and consciousness, represented through the ideal of śuddha varṇa and ultimately directed toward mokṣa. In this sense, social organization and spiritual aspiration were not entirely separate spheres but were understood as interconnected aspects of human life.

The observations found in Śukranīti further support this understanding. Social standing did not arise solely from divine decree or immutable hierarchy. It was shaped over time through function, reputation, contribution, skill, learning, and social utility. Communities rose and declined in status according to changing historical circumstances. This dynamic relationship between continuity and change helps explain both the remarkable stability and the immense diversity of Hindu society across centuries.

Seen in this light, the Hindu social system appears very different from the rigid and unchanging structure often imagined in contemporary discussions. It functioned as a living, adaptive, and spiritually oriented ecosystem. Varṇa provided the broader metaphysical direction, jāti provided the social framework (ācāra, vyavahāra), kula preserved ritual continuity, and ācāra supplied the living mechanism through which communities adapted to changing circumstances.

Appendix:

Venkata Subbarao Pantulu  Garu reiterates the importance of ācāra/lokācāra-

“If, in any region, caste (Kulam), or family, any special customs, practices, methods, or usages are found to have been followed continuously for a long time, then—even if they are contrary to the procedures laid down in the Dharmashastras—they are accepted in courts of law.

Not only do the Dharmashastras such as the Manusmriti and Yajnavalkya Smriti state that such usages should be considered valid without objection, but the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has also ruled accordingly.”

Please note that here he explicitly spoke about the existence of practices that were contrary to the Dharmaśāstras.

He said, “With regard to special customs, usages, or practices that are contrary to the Dharmashastras, one point is extremely important. Namely, such customs, usages, or practices must be shown clearly by evidence to have been observed continuously, without interruption or objection, and that the people following them did so with the understanding and acceptance that these alone were their rightful customs, usages, or practices. Otherwise, courts will not recognize such special customs, usages, or practices.

Another point is this: even if such special customs had been in force from ancient times, if evidence shows that they were abandoned in recent times, the courts do not recognize them; instead, judgments are rendered according to the procedures laid down in the Dharmashastras.”

“Although the Dharmashastras and their commentaries are the foundational authorities regarding the customs and legal practices of Hindus, the judgments delivered from time to time by the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, and Madras, as well as by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, came to be regarded as the highest authorities of all.

With reference to Ācāra Śrī Kilambi Venkata Srinivasacharyulu Garu said-

“It may be said that although the Dharmashastras are the principal instruments of legal administration, changes gradually arise in society due to differences in time and circumstance, as customs and practices develop among particular communities or in particular regions.

When such customs continue in practice for a very long time, and when the people as a whole come to regard and accept them as law, the government—that is, the legislative authority—brings them into force as law. Thus, customs that have long existed in society become recognized by the government as law, and in that manner such customs themselves become Dharmashastras.

Before attaining such recognition, these customs may appear to be contrary to existing Dharmashastras and even to transgress the earlier scriptural rules. Yet, because they have been practiced for a long time by particular communities or within particular regions with the acceptance of the people, they acquire an authority equal to that of law. Therefore, the courts also recognize such customs in the same manner as Dharmashastra.”

(It is an interesting observation that the Lokācāras becoming part of Dharmaśāstras, however this needs to be validated with further research)

He provides a classification of Ācāras-

“Classes of Customs — The customs now recognized by the courts may be divided into four kinds:

1. Customs generally prevailing among large communities consisting of various castes (Jatis).

2. Customs prevailing only in a particular region.

3. Customs prevailing only among a particular caste or community of people; that is, caste customs (kulacharas).

4. Customs prevailing only within particular individual families; that is, family customs (kutumbacharas).

Examples of such customs may be understood in many ways as one reads this work further.

Generally speaking, customs possess the authority even to modify or override the Dharmashastra rules applicable to the public at large. However, such customs must possess the characteristics described below.”

“In earlier times, scholars (pandits) were appointed in every High Court in order to explain the deeper meanings contained in our Dharmashastras. Now, in the absence of such scholars, legal matters are being decided directly.

Just as human attitudes and conditions change with the passage of time, the decisions of judges are also bringing about certain changes in the ancient Hindu legal system. Such changes arise in three ways:

1. Establishing new principles, based on what appears just and fair to the conscience in the present age, regarding matters not mentioned in the ancient Dharmashastras.

2. Clarifying hidden meanings in earlier commentaries where the interpretations are ambiguous or mutually contradictory.

3. Inferring and establishing new principles based on certain analogies and relationships found in the earlier Shastras.

Moreover, there is also the practice of abolishing certain provisions in the ancient Dharmashastras that appear unjust or inappropriate in present circumstances, and replacing them with methods regarded as just by contemporary society.

There are many such reforms introduced into the old Dharmashastra system through judicial decisions.”